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In this text we are attempting to think the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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In this text we are attempting to think the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia together, and always with its necessary connection to the 
International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court. By paraphrasing 
the title of another work, the long forgotten Hans Kelsen text from 1947 (today 
usually used by detractors of the Tribunal) “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg 
Trial constitute a Precedent in International Law?”2, I wish to distinguish between 
the two Tribunals (as well as The Treaty of Versailles), and in so doing treat inter-
national law as legislative history or judicial precedents (and their recognition). 
The two words in singular in the title of my text - judgment and precedent, - should 
cover many different judgments and precedents which would collectively institut-
––––––––––––– 
1 Чланак је рађен у оквиру научноистраживачког пројекта Института за филозофију и 
друштвену теорију у Београду Регионални и европски аспекти интегративних процеса у 
Србији: цивилизацијске претпоставке, стварност и изгледи за будуæност, који финан-
сира Министарство науке и заштите животне средине Републике Србије (бр. 149031). 
Презентиран је 30 марта 2006 године на међународном колоквијуму “Héritage philoso-
phique, contigence historique et universalité morale” у Паризу.  
2 H. Kelsen, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in Inter-
national Law?”, in The International Law Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1947, p. 153-171. 
This text has only been translated to Italian, in 1989. Danilo Zolo uses some of Kelsen’s argu-
ments in his criticism of the Tribunal. 
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ionalize justice and reconciliations, in continually new ways. It seems to me that an 
international court achieves success only if it institutionalizes a precedent. For the 
court to be “successful”, I assume, above all, that it puts an end to war. Only an 
international tribunal can definitely end war, whose main characteristics are always 
unprecedented atrocities.          
The idiom - mala in se or scelus infandum, “evils in themselves / wrongs in 
themselves” or “unspeakable crime” (a crime greater than any possible crime; the 
term genocide can be a similar word and a possible alternative) from the 
subheading of this text, are used by Carl Schmitt in a “Note”3 written on August 
25th 1945, in Berlin. Schmitt’s sentence that “scelus infandum must by no means 
become a precedent”, as well as his insistence that “Hitler’s scelus infandum and 
especially the monstrous atrocities of the SS and the Gestapo cannot be classified 
in their real essence by the rules and the categories of the usual positive law”, 
represent the conditions for the perpetual reconstruction of procedures and 
judgments of a tribunal and international law. It is precisely a crime, a monstrous 
and unforgivable and always unimaginable one, a crime which exceeds crime and 
then any adequate punishment, obligations and accountability, which introduces 
group, collective or state responsibility. It is at this uncertain and complicated tran-
sition between individual and collective responsibility (or shared responsibility), 
that I find the philosopher’s task (a philosopher who supplements to the jurist, for 
example the “philosopher” Kelsen who adjusts the “jurist” Kelsen etc.) and the 
philosophical problem. This complicated transition is a philosophical problem as 
well as a philosophical focus4. 
This is a reason why I would redirect the opening words of the title of this 
colloquium - “Héritage philosophique” (Philosophical heritage), in a different 
direction. I would not aim towards the reception of the Tribunal and the respon-
sibility of a “philosopher” from ex-Yugoslavia to find, or not find, a space for the 
Tribunal’s “acceptance” there, but rather, towards something else. I am interested 
in directing the idea of an eventual precedent by the Tribunal (the current or future 
ones, but necessarily the International Tribunals or International Courts) towards 
the word “sovereignty”, which is also found in the subheading of this work. The 
mantra of sovereignty which has been here for the past twenty years (and continues 
––––––––––––– 
3 C. Schmitt, “Note as Conclusion of the Opinion of prof. Dr. Carl Schmitt on ‘Das 
international-rechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges’ (August 1945)”, in Das international-
rechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges; und der Grundsatz “Nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege”, Hrsg. H. Quaritsch, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, S. 80-81. 
4 Here I repeat and follow, along with Virginia Held, the words which Annette Baier 
delivered in a Presidential Address before the Eighty-Seventh Annual Eastern Division Meeting 
of the APA in Boston December 29, 1990 in a text she titled “A Naturalist View of Persons”. 
“(…) when we make any kind of war, we are very ready to switch from individual to collective 
responsibility. (…) Our philosophical focus ought to be as much on collective as on individual 
responsibility, when we seek to understand ourselves as persons”. APA Proceedings, Vol. 65, 
No. 3, p. 6. Also V. Held, “Group Responsibility for Ethnic Conflict”, in The Journal of Ethics, 
No. 6, 2002, p. 157-178.   
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today, expecting new conflicts), followed by the active participation of philosoph-
ers in it (the mantra), have led to wars and terrible crimes. The wars in Yugoslavia 
were carried out because of and for sovereignty. The fiction of sovereignty - 
sovereignty that is a political emotion not a concept - led people to violence. And 
while the excessive desire for reality, excessive desire for sovereignty, first appear-
ed in Serbia and its province, this does not, in any way, reduce the responsibility of 
the other Republics and peoples for the spread of the sovereignty and war viruses. 
In contrast to Nuremberg, the Tribunal at The Hague has not yet taken a negative 
stance towards secessionist wars and “wars in the name of sovereignty” which took 
the form of wars of aggression. The lack of any kind of political support, which 
was in Nuremberg, as Kelsen witnesses, has made The Hague process very long, 
procedurally flawed, and beset with difficulty in reaching a verdict. Despite the 
accusations that have been made against most of the leaders and military elites of 
the countries which participated in these conflicts, despite the ongoing search for 
those accused of great crimes on all sides, the sovereignty of these new states has 
never been questioned. Specifically, the crimes as such, through which new states 
were formed, have never been questioned. It is precisely at this point that a 
judgment by the Tribunal (a judgment that has yet to occur) could produce a 
precedent. In question is the impotence of erasing the older concept of sovereignty 
which is based on violence and force.   
*     *     * 
Twelve years after leaving the Law University in Köln, after writing 
numerous books about international law and peace in Geneva, Harvard, and 
Berkley, Hans Kelsen became the legal adviser to the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission in Washington, charged with the task of preparing the legal and 
technical aspects of the Nuremberg trial. Unsatisfied with the direction and 
procedures of the trial, in mid-1947 Kelsen published a text concerning the 
Nuremberg Trial and the problem of “precedent”5.  Namely, the text was conceived 
as an answer to and analysis of the October 15, 1946, report to the President of the 
U.S. concerning the Nuremberg Trial, written by the U.S. representative to the 
court Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson (Justice Jackson). Kelsen was also in a 
position to view his many years of thinking and writing about international law in 
light of the hardships faced in the trial of the German war criminals. This text is 
especially important for us at its end where Kelsen warns of a new, forthcoming, 
war and future court. Before I attempt to present the main problems of institut-
ionalizing law into international law in the context of the International Tribunal and 
Court today, which Kelsen’s critique presents, I would like to cite his words:  
––––––––––––– 
5 The 1947 text, “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in 
International Law?”, was preceded by a noteworthy attempt by  Kelsen, in 1945, to stop several 
problems faced by the Tribunal. “The Rule against Ex Posto Facto Laws and the Prosecution of 
the Axis War Criminals”. The Judge Advocate Journal, 1945, No. 2, p. 8-11.  
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What really impairs the authority of the judgment is that the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility for the violation of rules of international law prohibiting war 
has not been established as a general principle of law, but as a rule applicable only 
to vanquished States by the victors. This is specially manifest by the fact that the 
principle laid down in the London Agreement for the punishment of European Axis 
war criminals has not been inserted into the Charter of the United Nations which, 
although supposed to be the basis of the international law of the future, still 
stipulates only collective responsibility of the States as such for violations of the 
Charter, imputable to the responsible State, not to the acting individuals. And even 
more objectionable than the fact that the London Agreement has the character of a 
privilegium odiosum imposed upon vanquished States by the victors is that the 
tribunal established by the Agreement was composed exclusively of representatives 
of victorious States directly affected by the crimes over which this tribunal had 
jurisdiction. (…) One of the fundamental questions to be decided by the tribunal was 
the question as to whether Germany, in resorting to war against Poland and the 
Soviet Union, violated international treaties concluded with the States whose 
representatives formed the court6.  
Found amongst these states, whose representatives are the judges and 
prosecution - continues Kelsen - is a state which had a pact with Germany and with 
whom this state divided Poland, as well as a state which entered into war with 
Japan breaking an existent non-aggression pact. Throughout the text, Kelsen 
attempts to defeat Robert Jackson’s argument that the rules of law applied by the 
International Military Tribunal have been “incorporated into a judicial precedent”, 
and he cynically concludes:   
If the principles applied in the Nuremberg trial were to become a precedent – a 
legislative rather than a judicial precedent – then, after the next war, the 
governments of the victorious States would try the members of the governments of 
the vanquished States for having committed crimes determined unilaterally and with 
retroactive force by the former. Let us hope that there is no such precedent.  
First, there is absolutely no precedent where Mr. Justice Jackson says there 
is one, instead it is found at a different point, where Kelsen would rather have 
none. To make the irony greater Kelsen himself, a few pages before the above 
fragment, in a certain way justified the existence of the most important precedent 
concerned with the principles of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Kelsen’s 
anger that the Charter of the United Nations, which he himself was preparing, was 
not the most important bases for the Tribunal’s verdicts opens the possibility that 
The Hague Tribunal might also be understood in the political context of winners 
and losers. However, perhaps the precedent itself (legislative, but also judicial), 
which all future courts must “create”, is the best means by which to stop all 
imprecise analogies and paraphrases of Kelsen’s warning from fifty years ago.     
 
––––––––––––– 
6 “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?”, p. 170-171.  
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Precedent 
The problems with forming international law7 and international tribunals8 
throughout history, which Kelsen wrote about before and after Nuremberg (he 
wasn’t the only one), show that the precedent /Präjudiz/ is a “normal” and 
simultaneously “essential” act as an answer to a certain problem9 (that is, a crime 
and its different forms). The first condition for calling a judicial decision a 
precedent, is that it must establish a new rule of law. In that case, the use of the 
institution of stare decisis in every subsequent verdict is satisfied. Therefore, the 
precedent becomes the new law10 and is established if there is no already 
established law “by legislation, custom or international treaty”, or if one decision 
fills the gap(s) in the law. There are countless reasons as to why numerous new 
precedents have been established in international law. In much smaller processes 
than the ones we mention here, the precedent was a “means” by which judicial 
efficacy was reached. Two interesting examples could lead us to a limited 
precedent which particularly interests Kelsen. This is a precedent which does not 
relate only to the future and all subsequent decisions of similar cases, but rather a 
precedent which acts retroactively, meaning backwards and before. A precedent 
whose force lies in the fact that it opens new cases in the past and enables the 
punishment for those acts which, when they occurred, were not “covered” by law, 
––––––––––––– 
7 “In the interests of peace it is better to speak of international right than – as only too 
often happens – to hold forth about a nebulous justice, and then to neglect the development of an 
international law which is still in its infancy. (…) The present state of international law is 
characterized by the fact that international common law – considered from a technical 
standpoint – is still in the stage of a primitive system of law, that is to say, it is at a stage from 
which the legal system of the individual States originally developed. This is a condition of 
extensive decentralisations”. H. Kelsen, The Legal Process and International Order, London, 
Constable & Co., 1935, p. 11, 14.  
8 “But experience teaches that states submit more easily to an international court than to 
an international government”. H. Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1942, p. 169.   
9 “Precedents are what they are because men faced with a problem and ask ‘Have we not 
had this before or something like it?’”. This sentence, uttered by Lord Wright, is found in 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen’s book Precedent in the World Court (Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 6). Shahabuddeen was a long time judge on the International Court of Justice (1988-
1997) and is a present day ICTY judge. “’Precedent’ is usually taken to mean any prior decision 
possible relevant to the present case to be decided (…) it is not necessary that the deciding court 
expressly adopts or formulates a decision to guide future decision-making in order to talk about 
it as a precedent. Being relevant for any future decision is sufficient”. R. Alexy, R. Dreier, 
“Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany”, in Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative 
Study. Ed. D. N. MacCormick, Aldershot, Darmouth, Ashgate, 1997, p. 17-64.  
10 Kelsen especially insists on the law-creating function of precedents and that a 
precedent must have binding force. “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?”, p. 154, 162. 
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and were therefore not processed. Therefore, it is not true that only justice can be 
late, law can be late as well. This lateness can be annulled thanks to, or luckily 
because of, the precedent. All this could be very important, and in some cases the 
extreme injustice of some laws (we’ll immediately speak of them).                 
The two examples I mentioned earlier are quite well known: in the case of 
Regina v. Imre Finta in Canada, a trial for “crimes against humanity” was carried 
out on the basis of a 1987 Canadian statute which permits retrospective application 
of international law. In its judgment the Court recognized the existence of “crimes 
against humanity” under international law before 1945; the Eichmann precedent 
illustrates the possibility of a State that did not exist at the time of the crime (Israel) 
trying to punish a foreign citizen for genocide, when it has a legitimate and 
fundamental link to the victims. Despite being determined to prove that the 
judgment in the Nuremberg Trail does not constitute any kind of precedent in 
international law, Kelsen nonetheless allows for the international agreement 
concluded on August 8, 1945, in London, for the Prosecution of European Axis 
War Criminals, by the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of America, 
France, and the Soviet Union, to be true precedents11. The argumentation he uses is 
interesting and overlaps with the critique of positivism (Kelsen’s) which at that 
time Gustav Radbruch was using in his two analyses of injustice and crimes against 
humanity12. Kelsen says that the law which was applied in the judgments at 
Nuremberg was ex post facto law. Specifically, the London Agreement “provides 
individual punishment for acts which, at the time they were performed were not 
punishable, either under international or under any national law. The rule against 
retroactive legislation has certainly not been respected by the London agree-
ment”13. However, despite the illegality of this law it, continues Kelsen, “seems 
also to be an exception to the rule against ex post facto laws”.  
Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that under positive 
law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made punishable 
with retroactive force. In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each 
––––––––––––– 
11 “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?”, p. 154, 155, 162. In this way the London Agreement are made more significant, but only 
under the condition that some of its amendments are necessarily incorporated into the Charter 
(p. 170).  
12 Radbruch publishes two texts immediately  following Nuremberg in Süddeutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung : “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht“ (1946, No. 1, S. 105-108) 
and “Zur Diskussion über die Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit“ (1947, No. 2, S. 131-135).  
13 In the first chapter of the August 1945 text “Die praktische Bedeutung des Satzes: 
‘Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’”, Carl Schmitt cites articles 7 I 8 of the so called 
“Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte”: 7. Nul home ne peut être accusé ni détenu que 
dans les cas déterminés par la loi, et selon les formes qu’elle a prescrites. 8. (…) et nul ne peut 
être puni qu’en vertu d’une loi établie et promulguée antérieurement au délit et légalement 
appliquée. Das international-rechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges; und der Grundsatz 
“Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”, Hrsg. H. Quaritsch, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, 
S. 19.  
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other, the higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for 
the international crime of the Second World War may certainly be considered as 
more important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto 
laws, open to so many exceptions14.   
 Does the “size” of the crime, or a crime found a posteriori, or defeat in a 
war dictate this exception and right to a precedent?  
This great confusion and typical objection are certainly easily overcome by 
the establishing of several additional measures and procedural conditions for the 
systematic application of a precedent. For example, Schmitt’s insistence in differ-
entiating mala prohibita and mala in se15 (or singular, malum in se) could be 
useful, but only under the conditions that the size of a great crime is not idealized 
and that the size of a small crime is not belittled, and further, that the jurisdiction of 
a tribunal, which could only possibly render a verdict differentiating the two, not 
be idealized, because it supposedly cannot punish malum in se16. It is not enough to 
remove the existence of this difference with standard positivistic arguments about 
morality which is not part of law, about the principle nonexistence of mala in se, 
about delict is not outside of law, about law as such being intrinsically good etc. 
Non acceptance of this difference has created a mutated and transformed gramma-
tical difference between mala-malum (number, the difference between plural and 
singular). When the Republic of Serbia’s team disputes the International Court of 
Justice’s jurisdiction in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), besides the argument that there was no intention to 
destroy a part of, groups, peoples (the number is already found in the text of article 
2), it continuously speaks of the number of victims and inhabitants before and after 
aggressions. The number of those killed is not enough (“…had been estimated 4 to 
12 victims of willful killing and a limited number of victims of inhuman treatment, 
totaling in all less than 20 persons”), says Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor 
––––––––––––– 
14 “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?”, p. 164, 165.   
15 “(…) mala in se, or wrong in themselves and those that are mala prohibita and wrong 
merely because they are punished by statute”. A text with no name and author entitled “The 
Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in se in Criminal Law”, Columbia Law Review, 
Vol. 30, 1930, p. 74-86. For Schmitt piracy is a “malum in se” in the absolute sense, while being 
a pirate means to be the enemy of all of humanity /ein Feind der ganzen Menschheit/ and 
waging war against humanity /gegen die Menschheit geführter Krieg/. Das international-
rechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges, S. 50-54.  
16 For Schmitt malum in se is committing a so called world crime /Weltverbrechen/ but 
no international criminal court has, as of yet, been found for it. C. Schmitt, “Völkerrecht. Ein 
juristisches Repetitorium, 1948/50”, in Frieden oder Pazifismus?, Arbeiten zum Völkerrecht 
und mit Anmerkungen versehen von G. Maschke, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2005, S. 766, 
823.  
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of the International Criminal Court, for the initiation of an investigation by the 
ICC.  
 (…) because the Statute requires consideration of admissibility before the Court, in 
light of the gravity of the crimes. Bearing in mind that a key consideration in this 
regard is the number of victims of particularly serious crimes, he concluded that the 
situation did not appear to meet the “gravity” threshold17.  
The number of the living will certainly be a decisive factor in the referend-
ums for independence of Montenegro or Kosovo, perhaps the latter one occurring 
even as soon as the end of this year. Violence of insufficient number and violence 
of excessive number seems to springs from the perversion of this difference 
between crimes and the refusal to accept this difference in some form. To avoid 
Schmitt’s theology, Kaufmann’s or Lauterpacht’s natural law, Kelsen’s positivism 
in international law etc., and to actualize law through justice, it is first of all – by 
means of the institution of precedent - necessary to revise the unconditionality of 
norms in public law. If there is a total contradiction (Radbruch calls it “intole-
rable”) between positive law and justice, which cannot be reduced, if the law is 
incorrect /unrichiges Recht/ and surpasses the level of tolerance (which can be 
accepted), then it is necessary to give justice the privilege (lex iniusta non est lex).  
One limit line /Grenzziehung/, can be drawn with most precision: where there is not 
even an attempt to achieve justice /wo Gerechtigkeit nicht einmal erstrebt wird/, 
where equality, the core of justice /Kern der Gerechtigkeit/, is deliberately disavo-
wed in the enactment of positive law, the law is not merely “incorrect law” /unricht-
iges Recht/, it lacks entirely the very nature of law /Rechtsnatur/. For law, including 
positive law, cannot be otherwise defined than as an order and legislation whose 
very meaning is to serve justice18.  
Because it is impossible to immediately remove certain laws which sow 
extreme injustice, in the Nazi era for example, where positive law loses its legal 
quality or its legal validity19, it must be done afterwards. In this way an unbreak-
––––––––––––– 
17 Letter from February 9th 2006. See The International Criminal Court and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.  
18 G. Radbruch, “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht“, Süddeutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung, 1946, No. 1, S. 107. This text is copied in G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie, 
Stuttgart, K. F. Köhler Verlag, 1973, S. 345-346. Also R. Alexy, „A Defence of Radbruch’s 
Formula“, in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Ed. D. Dyzenhaus, Oxford, 
Hart, 1999, S. 16., and F. Handelman, “G. Radbruch vs. H. Kelsen: A debate on Nazi Law”, in 
Ratio Juris, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2005, p. 162-178.   
19 In an interview, broadcast on the 6th of February 1972, on Südwestfunk radio in Baden 
Baden, Schmitt maliciously asks what the declared positivist Kelsen would do in Schmitt‘s place 
during Nazism, alluding to the fact that he (Schmitt) is not a positivist and that he did not 
attempt to “follow” and “use” the Reich’s laws. He then recalls a conversation from 1926 
between the Viennese Professor Hold von Ferneck and Kelsen. Ferneck asks his positivist 
colleague “If there is a case of a lunatic lawmaker who decides to kill ten people by firing squad 
each week, its not important for what reason, for example because they have red hair, should we 
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able connection would be made between the force of one law to represent a pre-
ventive measure (danger from injustice is recognized in advance) and the retro-
active force of one eventual law which stands above every law as such (justice can 
be reached in reverse by invalidating the injustice of the existing law). 
A precedent absolutely establishes relativism in law only if its use is 
completely restricted and if certain “structures” and “functions,” which are usually 
concerned with the sovereign or sovereignty, are protected and immunized. For 
example, the establishing of a precedent and the retroactive punishment of all those 
who committed different crimes, while “covered” by laws they themselves passed, 
should also encompass the dissolution of the very sovereignty based on which they 
legally controlled a certain territory and held executive power. All that is prob-
lematic in the history of imagining the International Tribunal or the International 
Court, from Kant to Kelsen, is found precisely at the point at which responsibility 
for crimes stops before the walls of sovereignty. Namely, a tribunal or court is the 
perfect opportunity for the responsibility for crimes to truly overcome the confines 
of the right to sovereignty or the rights of a people to self-determination or the right 
to self-constitution. What does this mean? That a tribunal or court, through 
precedent, can forever undermine the sovereignty of a state whose citizens partici-
pated in crimes, and in this way undermined the sovereignty of states as the subject 
of international law in general. Undermining does not mean a temporary with-
drawal and appropriation of a state’s sovereignty in the form of punishment coming 
from another state (that is, all other states) “possessing” it and giving it back to the 
“mutilated” state. Rather undermining represents a systematic demystification of 
sovereignty and sovereign violence (power, souveräne Gewalt20) founded on crime, 
and a diminished significance of force and violence in the constituting and preser-
––––––––––––– 
then treat that as justice and law?” Kelsen answered without hesitation: “I am a jurist, not a 
moralist”. Eclectica, Over en in zake Carl Schmitt, Hrsg. P. Tommissen, 1975, S. 105. This 
interview was recently translated to Italian, in the book C. Schmitt, Un giurista davanti a se 
stesso, a cura di G.Agamben, Vicenza, Neri Pozza, 2005, p. 41-66.      
20 Kant mentions sovereign authority (violence, but power as well) in paragraph 54 of the 
book The Metaphysics of Morals. “(…) A league of nations /Völkerbund/ in accordance with the 
idea of an original social contract is necessary, not in order to meddle in one another’s internal 
dissensions /nicht in die einheimischen Misshelligkeiten derselben zu mischen/ but to protect /zu 
schützen/ against attacks from without /gegen Angriffe der äusseren Feinde/. This alliance must, 
however, involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil constitution), but only an association 
/sondern nur eine Genossenschaft/ (federation); it must be an alliance that can be renounced at 
any time and so must be renewed from time to time /eine Verbündung, die zu aller Zeit aufge-
kündigt werden kann, mithin von Zeit zu Zeit erneuert werden muß/”. I. Kant, Practical Philo-
sophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 482-483. Die Metaphysik der Sitten, GS, Band VI, 
S. 344. In another text I worked on the unclear sentence “against attacks from without” (both 
Natorp and Vorländer have differing opinions of the meaning of this sentence as one word is 
missing from Kant’s work). It seems that it’s possible, in the context of Kant’s many lectures, to 
show that Kant allowed in international law interference “in another’s internal dissensions” 
(sovereignty) and that he defended the right to preventive war. 
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ving of rights (justice, the system etc.)21. The states represented in this tribunal, by 
daring to “interfere” in the sovereignty of a state or states - whose regimes waged 
wars in which crimes were committed - admit their own responsibility and share a 
kind of common ‘sovereign responsibility’ before the crimes committed. War is 
above all the defeat of the whole community as well as the defeat of its construct-
ion founded on sovereignty. The tribunal or court represents the ad hoc acceptance 
of this defeat.  
Precedent and Responsibility 
The true precedent of the London Agreements from August 1945, on 
which Kelsen insists and which as such should immediately be incorporated into 
the Charter of the United Nations, is concerned with responsibility. Here, again, is 
the fragment we already cited: 
What really impairs the authority of the judgment is that the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility for the violation of rules of international law prohibiting war 
has not been established as a general principle of law, but as a rule applicable only 
to vanquished States by the victors. This is specially manifest by the fact that the 
principle laid down in the London Agreement for the punishment of European Axis 
war criminals has not been inserted into the Charter of the United Nations which, 
although supposed to be the basis of the international law of the future, still 
stipulates only collective responsibility of the States as such for violations of the 
Charter, imputable to the responsible State, not to the acting individuals. 
The next war, the next court, and the future trouble Kelsen, because the 
winner does not apply these principles of individual criminal responsibility to 
himself, nor is he responsible as the State. For Kelsen the problematic inter-
pretations of several documents, on which a military tribunal bases its legality, also 
open the horizon of a new war, and consequently a new court. If we recognize the 
Tribunals and Courts in The Hague as Kelsen’s next imaginary court which follows 
real war (wars) – taking into account that the “legal and judicial history” of courts 
does not exist yet, and the fact that every ensuing international tribunal either used 
or neglected the experiences of the previous tribunals in a totally uncontrolled 
manner - it seems that the basic document “in the international law of the future” 
(today that “future” should be in The Hague) is not “Kelsen’s” Charter (The 
Charter of the United Nations) but rather “Mr. Justice Jackson’s” charter. Jackson, 
in the October 15, 1946 Report to the President, says that the agreements con-
cluded in London, in which individual criminal responsibility is central, are “a 
––––––––––––– 
21 This should be a completely contrary direction from Kelsen, as well as Kant. The main 
problem with international law and the absence of peace and security is, for Kelsen, the lack of a 
monopoly and coercive force, and because of that a total lack of decentralization. There is an 
important fragment concerning violence (force) and rights (“(…) without might no right can be 
instituted…”) In Kant’s Lectures on Ethics from 1793 (Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 
279 et seq.; GS, Band XXVII, S. 515 et seq.).  
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basic charter in the international law”22. Many deliberate misinterpretation of the 
Agreement were made, in order to give it advantage over the Charter, as well as the 
loss of all the legacies left by the processes carried out after The First World War. 
By systematically circumventing international law, in the favor of a precedent of 
individual criminal responsibility, the governments which acceded to the London 
Agreement “did not consider themselves obliged or authorized by existing 
International Law to prosecute organs of the guilty State as criminally responsible 
for its delict”23. Why? And furthermore, why is the emphasis, after sixty years, 
again on individual responsibility? Is it even possible to expect that this emphasis 
will be annulled, after almost thirteen years of the ICTY’s existence, by means of 
some sort of sudden precedent (this could be a pleonasm) or sudden agreement, 
which could reassign collective responsibility? Is it necessary to bring back the 
possibility of judgment in absentia? Is it possible to judge a deceased leader of a 
state thus saving the lengthy work of compiling evidence in the name of other 
processes? Is it possible to make a precedent and give a photograph, film, recorded 
telephone conversation etc. the status of evidence? Is it possible to revise “govern-
mentalities” of independent republics once when the judgment processes are 
finished and the main actors have been punished for their crimes? Is it necessary to 
reevaluate the idea of aggressive war and introduce criminal delict’s against peace? 
Is a judgment pertaining to the responsibility of a state for genocide all that is left 
for us to expect?   
Most of these questions bring us back to the beginning, to what Kelsen 
thought of for years, and to what is again becoming active in Hague, more 
specifically in the International Court of Justice: can a state be guilty and crimi-
nally responsible?24 But this is also Kant’s question or perhaps a much older one, 
the question addressed by Moses to God: the number; how many?; maybe two?; a 
family, a tribe, a mob, a group, a people; how many of them can be mobilized 
around evil?; Can a crime be committed collectively? Can this “collective” be held 
––––––––––––– 
22 “Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial constitute a Precedent in International 
Law?”, p. 168.  
23 H. Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International 
Law”, in The Jewish Yearbook of International Law, Jerusalem, Rubin Mass, 1949, p. 239.  
24 On March 7th 2006, Alain Pellet (CR /11, p. 26-42), in the name of the team from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, spoke and listed the specific remedies available in the standard sources 
on State responsibility: compensations, restitution, satisfaction, cessation and assurances and 
guarantees of non-repetition.  
“In order to refute the prevailing doctrine societas delinquere non potest (a corporation 
cannot commit a crime) and to prove that States can incur criminal responsibility, it is not 
necessary to make the hopeless attempt to demonstrate that the State as a juristic person is not a 
legal fiction but a real being, a super-individual organism, and the like. The decisive question is 
not whether the State is a legal fiction or a real thing but whether the sanctions which are to be 
directed against the State as such, that is, war and reprisals, can be interpreted as “punishment”. 
Such an interpretation is certainly possible”. H. Kelsen, Peace through Law, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1944, p. 73.  
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responsible and punished for these crimes? Who can even decide collectively and 
is collective responsibility a consequence of the forced “personification” and 
“integrity” of a political community?25    
Here are two examples which, each in their own way forced Moses and Kant 
to think “collective” responsibility through the prism of a precedent.   
1. The Lord was in the position of judging of Korah (Korahite), the first 
leftist in the history of humanity, and his two hundred and fifty Israelites’ 
(chieftains of the community) who rebelled against Moses and Aaron. Before the 
Lord definitely chooses Moses, and before he commits one of the most horrific acts 
of violence ever seen (this is the famous example, used by Walter Benjamin, of 
pure divine violence, violence without blood and violence which does not produce 
right) - as the earth will open and swallow all of them, their families, and all their 
possessions, as if they never existed - the Lord insists and attempts several times to 
physically separate the two sides so there is no collateral damage (“Stand back 
from this community that I may annihilate them in an instant!”)26. The difficulty in 
finding this borderline between the right group and the wrong one is made more 
demanding by Moses’ opposition and begging: “O God, Source of the breath of all 
flesh! When one man sins, will You be wrathful with whole community?27” This is 
a very good example of how insisting and calling for individual responsibility 
supposes a sovereign community and the protecting of the winner. Moses’ hypo-
critique /hypo-crisis/ and resistance before the Lord’s decision /crisis/, occurred 
while the majority, headed by Moses himself, already did not participate in sharing 
responsibility.      
2.  The always important second paragraph in Kant’s book Metaphysics of 
Morals, begins with a state (in the singular form) whose rights against an unjust 
––––––––––––– 
25 In the text “How can Individualists share Responsibility?” (Political Theory, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, May 1993, p. 228-248), Annette Baier connects these two Dworkian concepts with 
several of Kant examples of the death penalty and the sharing of responsibility from Lectures on 
Ethics and Metaphysics of Morals. 
26 Kant, in this magnificent example of an attempt to share responsibility, emphasizes 
precisely that which confirms the sovereignty of a community and limits responsibility. He finds 
two conditions which are key for constituting the concept of an Ethical Commonwealth: first is 
the assumption of the existence of a super moral being /eines höhern moralischen Wesens/, i.e. 
the idea of God, which enables Kant to call the community of people which manage to come out 
(of the state of nature) “People of God,” and the existence of another idea which contrasts the 
first one and the community: that is “the idea of a rabble of the evil principle” /die Idee einer 
Rotte des bösen Princips/. “To such a people of God we can oppose the idea of a rabble of the 
evil principle, the union of those who side with it for the propagation of evil, and whose interest 
it is to prevent the realization of that other union – although here again the principle which 
combats virtuous dispositions lies in our very selves and is represented only figuratively as an 
external power”. I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason alone, New York, Harper, 1934, 
p. 91; GS, Band VI, S. 100.                                                                                    
27 The JPS Torah Commentary, Numbers Bamidbar, tr. J. Milgrom, Philadelphia New 
York, Jewish Publication Society, 1990/5750, p. 135. Numbers 16, 21-22.  
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enemy /ungerechte Feind/ have no limits (“no limits with respect to quantity or 
degree, however there are limits with respect to quality”). An unjust enemy 
represents a state (Kant will eventually, at the end of the fragment, say that it is a 
state28) which deserves to be eliminated or whose government deserves to be 
eliminated. Within the fragment, Kant makes several stipulations as to what sort of 
treatment an unjust enemy deserves. He attempts to limit the punishment that all 
other states exact upon this state which is not an enemy, which is below the level of 
enemy. Such an enemy is unjust because its status as subject or state is completely 
uncertain. This is perhaps a “country” which is in a state of nature, a tyrannical 
country, a rogue country etc. But before all of this, it is a state which threatens 
neighboring states by arming and it is a state which violates public contracts.    
Since this can be assumed to be a matter of concern to all nations whose freedom is 
threatened by it, they are called upon to unite against such misconduct /sich gegen 
einen solchen Unfug zu vereinigen/ in order to deprive the state of its power to do it. 
But they are not called upon to divide its territory among themselves /um sich in sein 
Land zu teilen/ and to make the state, as it were, disappear from the earth, since that 
would be injustice against its people /denn das wäre Ungerechtigkeit gegen das 
Volk/, which cannot lose its original right /sein ursprüngliches Recht/ to unite itself 
into a commonwealth /ein gemeines Wesen/, though it can be made to adopt a new 
constitution that by its nature will be unfavorable to the inclination of war29. 
These famous “standards of sovereignty” (“unjust enemy”, “injustice against 
people”, “original right) have been unreservedly repeated for more than two 
hundred years. They are brought into question not only through historical context 
(from epoch to epoch they remain unchanged) with perpetually similar wars, 
enemies, and crimes. Even for The Hague, even failure in The Hague, which Kant 
mentions in paragraph sixty one (Kant’s book was published in 1797), today can 
represent a cruel analogy30. So, while all the peoples (nations) were “called”, in the 
––––––––––––– 
28 Both Vattel and Achenwall, from whom Kant takes this idiom, are much more hesitant 
to call this enemy a state.  
29 I. Kant, Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 487. Die Meta-
physik der Sitten, GS, Band VI, S. 349. This paragraph is complemented with a very interesting 
fragment from Kant’s lectures on natural law, from 1784 (from Feyerabend’s notes). In the 
context of jus praeventionis Kant analyzes occupatio bellica with all his institutions, such as 
restitution, “Die Quantitas der Satisfactio”, indemnitas etc. GS, Band XXVII, S. 1372, 1373 et 
seq.  
30 “Such an association of several states to preserves peace can be called a permanent 
congress of states, which each neighbouring state is at liberty to join. Something of this kind 
took place (at least as regards the formalities of the right of nations for the sake of keeping the 
peace) in the first half of the present century, in the assembly of the States General at the Hague. 
The ministers of most of the courts of Europe and even of the smallest republics lodged with it 
their complaints about attacks being made on one of them by another. In this way they thought 
of the whole of Europe as a single confederated state which they accepted as arbiter, so to speak, 
in their public disputes. But later, instead of this, the right of nations survived only in books; it 
disappeared from cabinets or else, after force had already been used, was relegated in the form 
of a deduction to the obscurity of archives“. Ibid, p. 487-488; S. 350.   
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end there were only “several”; and only two states, Russia and Prussia, which 
deprived the power of the enemy, the unjust enemy of the day being Poland; its 
territory was completely divided and annexed (Kant stays quiet about all this). In 
viewing the new Polish constitution, adopted on May 3rd 1791, Kant is completely 
skeptical. He believed nothing that come from Poland was trustworthy because that 
state had no middle class, nor culture31. In Kant’s opinion “having culture” or 
“being at a certain cultural stage,” necessarily leads to war. In this way the circle is 
definitely closed, because “the highest stage of culture is the state of war of the 
peoples in equilibrium...” /die höchste Stufe der Cultur ist der Kriegszustand der 
Völker im Gleichgewicht.../32. Those who should “give” or “allow” the people to 
“adopt a new constitution that by its nature will be unfavorable to the inclination of 
war” /sondern es eine neue Verfassung annehmen zu lassen, die, ihrer Natur nach, 
der Neigung zum Kriege ungüstig ist/, themselves do not posses such a constitu-
tion. Kant’s (and not only Kant’s) suggestion truly sounds attractive and “loving”: 
instead of dividing and destroying this harmful state, all nations or a group of states 
are supposed to give these people what they themselves do not posses (“their 
original right to unite” ostensibly making them innocent and not responsible for 
what their government has done). Otherwise, they are allowed the impossible: to 
alone find that which no one possesses yet. 
More than one hundred and fifty years later, in the middle of a horrible war 
and before the Trials at Nuremberg, the so-called “Four-Power Declaration” was 
adopted at the historic Moscow conference. Here again a “loving” moment occurs, 
as the Declaration concludes that it is necessary to quickly establish a general 
international organization “based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, 
for the maintenance of international peace and security”33. It would be truly 
unacceptable and false to be satisfied with certain hypocritical passages in these 
famous examples as they contain crimes and extreme violence within their foun-
dations. Crimes “organize” or “initiate” the crisis of sovereignty because an end to 
the war which produces them (these crimes) is expected. It is at the moment at 
which a court puts an end to a war that the sovereignty of all of its actors also 
––––––––––––– 
31 Kant, in his Lectures in Anthropology from the winter semester of 1784/85 (from 
Mrongovius’ notes), says that freedom is necessary for the passing of a civil constitution, 
followed by laws or restrictions on the freedoms of an individual, so that he would not infringe 
upon the freedom on another (individual) and force/violence/Gewalt/, for the law to be set. 
Poland and Turkey are negative examples. Turkey being an example of despotism, while Poland 
has too much freedom, none respects the laws and a harmonious whole cannot be established. I. 
Kant, GS, Band XXV (2), S. 1424.  
32 I. Kant, GS, Band VII, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht. 2. Nachdr. D. Ausg. 
1917, S. 411.  
33 The Conference was held in October 1943 with the participation of the Governments 
of United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. The quote is 
taken from H. Kelsen’s text “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for Inter-
national Organization“, in The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 53, March, 1944, No. 2, p. 207.  
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comes to an end. There is no war: there is no sovereignty, but only during the 
court’s tenure. It is the court that principally oppresses sovereignty and necessarily 
makes everyone responsible. Only if the court were to exist perpetually is Kelsen’s 
threatening horizon of a future war, and consequently a future court, prevented.  
Here are several possible conditions and precedents which are, today, at the 
disposal of the International Tribunal and which create a balance between indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, a state which is guilty and criminally responsible, 
and the responsibility of all:   
1. The principle of collective responsibility is constructed on the idea that the 
one who committed a delict is not the only one responsible, but that others are as 
well. First, because every individual belongs to a certain community (the smallest 
possible legal community34) and an ad hoc international community or state of all, 
and second, because it is impossible and unjust that one individual, as a part or 
organ of a community, answers alone for the crimes (mala in se, scelus infandum) 
he committed.35  
2. An international court legalizes sanctions already imposed on a 
community in the form of reprisals and war.36 In this way the court should use what 
the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact stipulates: all states are part of one joint convention37 
and are all authorized (not only the immediate victim of a possible armed attack) to 
resort to war against a state which in violation of this convention has undertaken an 
armed attack. Every armed attack belongs to the “war of aggression” family and is 
illegal. The only legal armed action is an action of all against one /erga omnes, 
“action contre un Etat fautif”/.38     
––––––––––––– 
34 H. Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations, Harvard University Press, 1942, 
p. 98; “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to 
the Punishment of War Criminals, in California Law Review, Vol. 31, 1942-43, p. 532, 534.  
35 In an indictment, signed by the prosecutor Richard J. Goldston on February 13th 1995, 
one convict from The Hague is charged with 140 of the gravest criminal offences. 
36 See I. Brownlie, “The Concepts of just war and just reprisals”, in State Responsibility, 
Part I, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 3-4.  
37 Kelsen analyzes one version of Article 11 the League of Nations (after the March 11th 
resolution was adopted ) in the book Legal Technique in International Law, A Textual Critique 
of the League Covenant, in Geneva Studies, Vol. X, No. 6, December 1939, p. 82 I et seq. “Any 
war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is 
hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League take any action…”  
38 The Kellogg-Briand Pact replaced the classic, and always problematic, distinction 
between just and unjust wars with a new distinction between legal and illegal wars. But, only 
this agreement again opens the possibility for a definite return to a radical doctrine concerning 
the forbiddance of war (hors la loi or “outlawry of the war”). E. Kaufmann, Règles générale du 
droit de la paix, in Recueil des cours, Paris, Sirey, 1935, Tome 54, p. 597, 599, 602, 603. 
Kelsen’s text “E possibile e desiderabile definire l’aggressione ?” (Scritti di diritto internazio-
nale in onore di Tomaso Perassi, Vol. II, Milano, Giuffre, 1957, p. 3-19), is the final, in a series 
of texts which expound on the impossibility to define aggression and Kelsen’s attempt to justify 
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3. An international court should be placed on the territory where the crimes 
were committed because this (territory) is an ad hoc part of the international 
community. It is impossible to achieve the reconciliatory benefit of a war crimes 
trial far from the place where the crimes occurred. The institution of the condo-
minium or “supreme authority”39 is the only possibility for eliminating any kind of 
legislative competence and the status of the subject of the state whose parts com-
mitted crimes. The suspension of sovereignty -- “without ‘annexing’ and without 
intention of permanent acquisition,” and without intention of temporary acquisition 
-- removes any kind of possibility for restrictiveness, because the essence of 
sovereignty is elasticity and adaptability to any kind of limitation40.    
4. By the court not accepting an individual’s function as a valid defence nor 
their belonging to a larger hierarchy which demands obedience, this court removes 
the obstacle to the sovereign or chief (head) of state being prosecuted under 
international criminal law. By judging the sovereign it is possible to reconstruct the 
historic relationship between crime and sovereignty. Crimes in the name of 
sovereignty frequently precede crimes which are on the International Tribunal’s 
agenda, but implicate them41. However, this reconstruction initiates the suspension 
of international immunity (much more important than national42) which a sovereign 
enjoys as the sovereign and which is the key foundation of sovereignty as such.     
 
––––––––––––– 
the existence of the permanent members of the Security Council, who make this decision 
through consensus.  
39 See H. Kelsen, “The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin”, 
in American Journal of International Law, vol. 39, 1945, p. 522, 524-525; “Collective and 
Individual Responsibility for Acts of State in International Law”, in The Jewish Yearbook of 
International Law, Jerusalem, Rubin Mass, 1949, p. 236-237.   
40 E. Kaufmann, Règles générale du droit de la paix, p. 359. “L’essence de la 
souveraineté consiste donc dans le fait d’être sujette à des restrictions, résultant soit du fait 
général de la coexistence des Etats, soit des relations particulières avec des Etats déterminés, et 
de subir des limitations de la plénitude des pouvoirs qu’elle comprend virtuellement”.  
41 The idea of reason of state or state secret hides the crimes which lie in the foundations 
of the creation of a state, preservation of state power, and protection from foreign or internal 
enemies. The sovereign is first of all the robber of his own sovereignty. “A people should not 
inquire with any practical aim in view into the origin of the supreme authority to which it is the 
subject, that is, a subject ought not to reason subtly for the sake of action about the origin of this 
authority, as a right that can be still be called into question (ius controversum) with regard to the 
obedience he owes it”. I. Kant, Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 461. 
Die Metaphysik der Sitten, GS, Band VI, S. 318.  
42 The most famous example is the refusal of the Netherlands to extradite ex-Kaiser “for 
a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”. Soon after the end 
of World War I, in 1919, written in the Report of Commission of Responsibilities, on page 19:  
“However, even if, in some countries, a Sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted in a 
national court of his own country the position from an international point of view is quite diffe-
rent”.  
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Precedent and Sovereignty 
The meaning and power of the word “sovereignty” (today, still, the first, 
most important, and frequently mentioned word by governments from the ex-
Yugoslav territories43), one of the most problematic terms in international law and 
a word which has “lost any precise meaning”44, was inaugurated by President Josip 
Broz Tito. Almost sixty years ago, in August 1946, an incident occurred on 
Yugoslavian territory, today belonging to Slovenia, which is mentioned in all 
American military manuals dealing with intervention. The seventy-fourth US 
intervention, since its inception, was marked as a nuclear naval threat to 
Yugoslavia, which ended on August 31st of the same year45. First, on August 9th, 
three Yugoslav fighter planes fired on an American transport plane and forced it to 
land somewhere near Ljubljana. The pilot was wounded during this incident. Ten 
days later, only two miles from the Austrian border, a US military plane was shot 
down by Yugoslav fighters north of lake Bled. All five passengers were killed. On 
that occasion Marshall Tito declared that the US aircraft repeatedly flew over 
Yugoslav territory, that they violated its sovereign territory despite his month’s 
long frequent protests. Tito continues saying that “certain countries” strive for “an 
imperialistic peace”, but that Yugoslavia does not want peace at any price with 
those “who wish to achieve their imperialistic aims at the expense of peoples who 
have sacrificed for the common cause all they possible could.” Finally concluding 
his declaration with “I wish to prove who is making provocations and who wishes 
to deny us our rights”46. The untouchable and absolute sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (already in next year 
demonstrations were organized throughout the country because of the “Trieste 
case”), is the result of the great victories in World War II and civil war, the victims 
and sacrifices of which the president speaks, and his frequent successful 
maneuverings, which enabled Yugoslavia to stay independent of the Soviet 
––––––––––––– 
43 The governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are 
still attempting to “bridge the gap between sovereignty and self-determination.” In a, November 
15th, 2005, resolution by the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia concerning the terms for a 
political discussion on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, the concept and term “soverei-
gnty and territorial integrity” is mentioned four times.  
44 H. Kelsen, “The Legal Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin”, in 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 39, 1945, p. 522. More specifically, the crisis of 
sovereignty and diminishing importance of this word begins with the Peace of Versailles. 
“Territorial sovereignty was transformed into an empty space for socio-economic processes”. C. 
Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, New York, Telos Press, 2003, p. 252 (German original S. 
226).  
45 After a very tense situation and much insistence and pressure from America, Yugo-
slavia, in the end, states that it will no longer attack US planes and issues a statement of regret.   
46 Extracts from Chicago Tribune Press Service, August 10th, 1946 and New York Times 
August 21st , 1946.  
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Union’s influence. For the next two decades in all of the most famous international 
law manuals, sovereignty was defined by fantastic doctrinaire acrobatics, which 
have additionally injected a fictive power into this word.47 On one 
side,? sovereignty is understood in its strictest sense, given to it by Vattel, as rule 
independent of any others state (any foreigner; sans dependence d’aucun 
etranger48). In fact Yugoslavia is an absolutely closed Fichtean commercial state 
opposed to the imperialistic west and its peace as mentioned by Tito (the only 
exception is war reparations paid for Great War destruction). On the other side, 
because the worker and working class are truly sovereign, it was necessary to 
rethink and redefine this always overly bourgeoisie concept of “sovereignty”.49 The 
idea of an absolutely new and open “sovereignty”, or sovereignty that has yet to 
take place, and in which all proletarian states could eventually take part, represents 
a never truly discussed avant-garde theory. If there is any kind of ex-Yugoslavian 
philosophical legacy it is to be found here, with all of its living or deceased heirs 
(the assassinated prime minister being on of them). “Praxis Philosophy” was built 
in this contrast and this tension which existed nowhere in Europe at this time. This 
“condition” within the state and within its “theory of sovereignty” was only 
possible as long as there were problems and pressures either from the west or from 
the east. With the first nationalist ferment, with economic difficulties, with the 
unoriginal and archaic changes to the constitution, the republics de jure inherit, 
each one individually, an identical governing apparatus and an identical 
complicated ideology. All the republics, along with the two provinces within 
Serbia, were absolutely independent states within one state, while the communist 
party (and Yugoslav army) represented a common sovereign who overshadowed 
the others’ sovereignties like a specter. All the assumption pointed to this model 
––––––––––––– 
47 The academic Milan Bartoš defines a state’s right to independence as “the right of a 
state to act freely in international affairs and within its territorial borders, without unauthorized 
interference from other states or organizations, in these actions.” (Medjunarodno javno pravo, 
Beograd, 1954, I, s. 272); Smilja Avramov, former advisor to Slobodan Milošević and witness 
in his defence at The Hague, in her book Medjunarodno javno pravo (Beograd, 1963, s. 76), 
writes: “Understood as going under sovereignty is the legal and factual ability of a state to 
undertake its functions within the state and in international affairs, independents of any and all 
others governments”. In his 1949 text, “Načelo suvereniteta naroda u medjunarodnim odnosima 
i radnička klasa”, from 1949 (Komunist, No. 5, s. 57), Aleš Bebler say that the institution of so-
vereignty has withstood the critiques of dialectical materialism and today remains the basic right 
of a state. Also see M. Despot’s book Suverenitet u prostoru iznad državne teritorije, Beograd, 
1966, s. 13-24. 
48 E. Vattel, Le Droit des gens, (1758), Book I, Chapter 1, paragraph 4.  
49 It is possible to find several subjects of sovereignty (“sovereign rights of the working 
people, peoples (nations) and nationalities (national minorities)”) within the constitution of the 
SFRY. The following text, written at the brink of Yugoslavia’s break up, by Slobodan Samar-
dzić, the current advisor to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, researches the diffe-
rences between the constitutional arrangements of the SFRY and other multinational federations. 
“Dilemma of Federalism in Yugoslavia – Problem of Sovereignty in a Multinational Federa-
tion”, in Praxis International, Vol. 11, No. 3, October, 1991, p. 377-386.  
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being able to last and function perfectly as a so-called well “organized 
hypocrisy”50. The problem was the province of Kosovo, with aspirations to become 
the seventh Yugoslav republic, and the Republic of Serbia, with its wish to make 
itself equal to the other republics, by putting an end to both provinces and establish 
control over all of its territory. Milošević’s insistence continued for several years, 
and in December of 1986 he said the following:  
Promene u političkom sistemu treba da omoguće SR Srbiji da ostvari status koji 
nema, status Republike, ravnopravan sa statusom svih drugih republika u Jugo-
slaviji. Srbija ne traži da bude više republika od drugih republika, ali, sigurno je, ne 
može dozvoliti ni da bude manje republika od drugih51.   
In April 1987 he speaks in Kosovo. Here is the conclusion of that 
speech:  
Ali, spremnost naroda i Kosova, i Srbije, i Jugoslavije, da se problemi reše i da 
svako da svoj doprinos, i da svi zajedno zasučemo rukave, da ih rešimo je ona 
garancija da ćemo rešiti i sistemske, i privredne, i političke probleme na Kosovu. 
(…) Jugoslavija ne postoji bez Kosova ! Jugoslavija se dezintegriše bez Kosova! 
Jugoslavija i Srbija neće dati Kosovo! 52 
––––––––––––– 
50 This is a paraphrase of the subheading of Stephen D. Krasner book, Sovereignty, 
Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton University Press, 1999. The “problem of sovereignty” is treated 
in an interesting way in the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(SANU) (Dobrica Cosić, the future president of Yugoslavia, was then the president of the 
Academy), a document written in the fall of 1986 and published in the famous “conspiratorial” 
and “unfinished” version on Zagreb (the journal Naše teme, 1989, Vol. 33, No. 1-2, s. 128-163). 
Written in Chapter 6a, The Sovereignty of People, is: “The sovereignty of the people: At the 
very foundations of modern civilization is the idea that political power is vested in the people, 
that the sole legitimate political authority is the one which derives from the freely expressed will 
of the people, and that therefore there are no moral or legal grounds for any elite (by the will of 
God, by blood, religion, race, ideological credentials, historical merit or on any other grounds) 
to arrogate to itself the right to speak, decide, or use force on behalf of a nation. (…) The 
principle of the sovereignty of the people has been affirmed by the democratic political philo-
sophy and practice of the democratic revol’ utions of the 18th century. However, socialist theory 
has taken this principle to extremely radical lengths. If a monopoly of economic power is also 
one of the means by which elites are formed, which can foist themselves upon society and gain 
full control over its political life, than all the institutions which make such a monopoly of power 
are incompatible with the principle of the sovereignty of the people, regardless of whether it is 
big capital or a bureaucratic state. In this sense, full sovereignty of the people could be achieved 
only in a classless society, in which political, economic, and cultural life would be organized in 
a democratic manner” (s. 145).     
51 S. Milošević, Godine Raspleta, Beograd, BIGZ, 1989, s. 121.  
52 Ibid, s. 145-146.  
“Because of this, even today, when speaking of the province of Kosovo and Metohija, 
we expect, with full confidence, that the Security Council, with the force of its authority, will 
ensure that even in the case of Serbia and Montenegro the indestructible principles of respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity will not be ignored. I am convinced that it is our common 
belief that the fragmentation of a confirmed democratic state is unthinkable, and that, against its 
Petar Bojanić,  Will the Judgement in the Hague Constitute a Precedent...  
 
 
112 
In October of 1988, at the 17th Congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, Milošević addressed his comrades, communists from the other repub-
lics who had for several years refused to support him in changing the status of 
Serbia: 
Medjutim, u nastojanju da sačuvaju svoje pozicije oni pokušavaju da blokiraju 
promene Ustava. Čak, i to smo videli, izvlačenjem na svetlost dana iz duhovnog 
naftalina, upozorenje o opasnosti koja se svima sprema od “Velike Srbije”. Odmah 
da vam kažem drugovi, Srbija, kao što je poznato, nema pretenzija na teritorije 
drugih republika, ali ima pretenzija na teritoriju svoje Republike. Da li je ta teritorija 
velika ili mala, zavisi od aršina kojim se meri, ali tolika kolika je ona mora da ostane 
i takva će i da ostane. I u tome Srbija očekuje podršku svih republika, kao što je 
sama spremna da takvu podršku drugima da, što je uostalom u sličnim situacijama, 
kad su druge republike bile u pitanju, uvek činila53.  
This last fragment is an excellent example of an introduction to a sovereign 
act as “pretension” (this is the world used by the president) to “have” that which 
already belongs to you and is already yours. The idiom “I want only what is mine” 
is complimentary to the idiom “leave me alone,” and the true shape of so-called 
“negative sovereignty”54. First, the president requests something of the others in 
order to violate the constitution, pass a new constitution, and in a certain way make 
a precedent which only concerns him. It seems that he is not capable of doing this 
himself or of giving up, if this support is not given. So that he doesn’t have to give 
up, he uses the “restriction of the sovereign” (“I don’t want the others, I want 
mine”), the “restriction of the threat” (“I could take the others”) and the “restriction 
of the just” (“but I want only mine”). The threat is perfectly accomplished and 
strengthened by the sentence in which the president mentions a “Greater Serbia” 
––––––––––––– 
will, its intentionally recognized borders be changed.” Speech by the Prime Minister of the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, V. Koštunica, at a Security Council meeting about Koso-
vo and Metohija, October 24th, 2005. 
53 Ibid, s. 269.  
54 The distinction between positive and negative sovereignty began as a retort to Isaiah 
Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative liberty. See P. Kahn, Chapter I. ‘Positive and 
Negative Sovereignty in International Law’, “The Question of Sovereignty”, in Stanford Journal 
of International Law, Summer 2004, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 260-265. This sort of distinction belongs 
to the old attempts at redefining and saving the concept of sovereignty (and to perhaps again 
think the abandonment of sovereignty or the myth of its abandonment). One of the most famous 
distinctions refers to the difference between legal and effective sovereignty. This difference 
could possibly be found in the distinction made by Robert Jackson between states and quasi-
states, where the “quasi” refers to the percent based on which one state is a state or is still not a 
state. In this sense all states are de jure sovereign, but are not de facto or perhaps only so in a 
certain measure. This means that states differ absolutely in the amount of sovereign power they 
can use, and this foremost depends on the strength of its institutions. Therefore, states have 
completely different capacities and competence to participate in the international and trans-
governmental regimes, to control the territory over this they have sovereignty, to exercise the 
domestic dimensions of legal sovereignty, to govern domestic affairs and control borders etc.  
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(in the speech itself the word is found in quotation marks). It is not “Greater 
Serbia” that is in spiritual naphthalene but the “warning of the danger” of Serbia, 
which is supposed to expand. The president mentions the Turkish word “arshin” 
(an imperial measure55) and plays with the attributes of greater and smaller which 
pertain to the present-future territory. Serbia is real, as big as it is, says the 
president, and it will stay that way. Naphthalene is a poisonous and flammable 
chemical used for protection against pests and cleaning. Bringing something out of 
naphthalene means that something was set aside, carefully removed, and saved for 
another time, but also that it was saved and that it exists as such. That what is being 
brought out of naphthalene are the warnings and fears of the proletariat comrades 
who block the pretensions of the sovereign. Both the naphthalene and spirit (the 
spirit which is flammable, which is both a poison (pharmakon) and remedy, 
because it protects and preserves this “warning of the danger”) are in the others 
possession. This is very important, and is in no way a mistake or clumsiness in the 
sovereign’s use of words and threats56.  
The support of all the comrades was de facto and de iure received a short 
time later, but only after Milošević alone suspended the old constitution and in so 
doing terminated the autonomous provinces. In a series of declarations concerning 
sovereignty and referendums, all the ex-Yugoslav republics followed Milošević’s 
sovereign act. From that moment, the right to sovereignty and self-determination 
was defended by aggression and crime.    
 
––––––––––––– 
55 Arshin (metric unit) measures 61 centimetres, but in the hands of the Turkish Emperor, 
who ruled Serbia for centuries, arshin is a measure which changes based on the one who is 
doing the measuring.  
56 Complementary to the fear of a Greater Serbia is the fear of a Greater Albania. In the 
text “Tragedy of National Conflicts in ‘Real Socialism’. The case of the Yugoslav Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo” (Praxis International, Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 423) M. Marković, the future head 
of Milosevic’s Socialist Party writes: “Albanians would have to be prudent enough to renounce 
the impossible program of creating a Great Albania from the parts of existing Balkan states. 
Each of those states – Yugoslavia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary – have millions of 
Albanians as minorities living in their countries. Albanians would have to settle to that. And 
rather than jeopardizing their autonomy in Kosovo by abusing it, they should make best use of 
their rights and liberties and materials aid that would be available in Yugoslavia and Serbia”.   
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ДА ЛИ ЋЕ ПРЕСУДА ХАШКОГ СУДА УСТАНОВИТИ 
ПРЕСЕДАН У МЕЂУНАРОДНОМ ПРАВУ? 
О великом злочину (mala in se; scelus infandum) и суверенитету 
 
У тексту, чији наслов представља парафразу наслова познатог Келсеновог текста 
из 1947 године (“Will the judgment in the Nuremberg trial constitute a precedent in inter-
national law”), истражујем однос злочина (ратних злочина, злочина против мира, чо-
вечности; појединачне или колективне одговорности, казне, итд.) и суверенитета но-
вих држава бивше Југославије. Путем компаративне анализе неколико основних пој-
мова и институција међународног права који утемељују функционисање Нирнбер-
шког и Хашког суда, намера ми је да испитујем могућност установљења преседана у 
Келсеновом смислу. Дакле, да ли је могуће да Хашки суд произведе правну одлуку 
или правну пресуду која би у будућности могла да послужи у сличним случајевима?  
Кључне речи: преседан, међународно право, одговорност, суверенитет, пресуда. 
 
 
 
